Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies
Volume 15

Article 20

1-1-2006

Principle and Imagination in Judging: A Conversation with Mr.
Justice James MacPherson
Peter Dostal
Jessica Gin-Jade Chan

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/djls

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative
Works 3.0 License.
Recommended Citation
Peter Dostal & Jessica Gin-Jade Chan, "Principle and Imagination in Judging: A Conversation with Mr.
Justice James MacPherson" (2006) 15 Dal J Leg Stud 273.

This News Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For
more information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca.

PRINCIPLE AND IMAGINATION IN JUDGING . . . 273

INTERVIEW

PRINCIPLE AND IMAGINATION IN JUDGING:A
CONVERSATION WITH
MR. JUSTICE JAMES MACPHERSON
PETER DOSTAL1 AND JESSICA GIN-JADE CHAN2

I. INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 2005, Mr. Justice James MacPherson of the Ontario Court
of Appeal began his visiting term at the Dalhousie University Faculty
of Law. During his visit, Justice MacPherson spoke with two students
about several issues that have engaged him during his career as a lawyer, academic and judge.3 The conversation raised a number of questions
about Canada’s changing legal landscape, and how the judiciary has attempted to balance the role of legal principle and judicial imagination in
law-making. How, for example, has the public’s sceptical perception of
our evolving justice system subjected judges to a higher degree of scrutiny? The result has often been an apparent trade-off between principle
and perception. What are the new dilemmas in our administration of justice? More than ever before, an applicant’s right to a principled and fair
hearing has been compromised by systemic problems preventing access
to the courts. Consequently, courts are being pressed to be more imaginative. To what extent, then, should judges articulate the intuitive (and
sometimes personal) premise that often lies at the heart of their judgement? The weight of all these issues has placed judges in a position to
re-consider their role in the justice system, and how they can balance
principle and imagination to better adapt to the needs of society.
1

B.Sc., is currently a second-year student at the Dalhousie University Faculty of
Law.
2
  B.F.A.,  M.Pub.,  is  currently  a  ﬁrst-year  student  at  the  Dalhousie  University  Faculty  
of Law.
3
Interview took place the morning of February 17th, 2006.
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Justice MacPherson brings his unique perspective to these issues
from his vast experience in the legal system. He was counsel for the
Government of Saskatchewan in many early landmark constitutional
decisions,  he  served  as  an  ofﬁcer  in  the  Dickson  Court4, and was later
involved   as   a   judge   in   several   high   proﬁle   decisions,   such   as   the   recent Ontario same-sex marriage appeal, Halpern. v. Canada.5 A graduate of Dalhousie Law School in 1976, Justice MacPherson has had a
remarkable legal career. He began as a law professor at the University of Victoria, spent time as Director of the Constitutional Branch of
Saskatchewan,  and  later  was  Executive  Legal  Ofﬁcer  of  the  Supreme  
Court of Canada. He was the Dean of Osgoode Hall Law School until
his appointment as a judge of the Ontario Superior Court, and later the
Ontario Court of Appeal.6
***
Early in your career, you acted as intervener on behalf of Saskatchewan  for  several  landmark  cases,  so  you  know  ﬁrst-hand  how  signiﬁcant  the  role  of  an  intervener  can  be  in  inﬂuencing  judges.  You  
have  recently  advocated  that  courts  encourage  entrance  of  interveners  through  “broad  and  liberal  deﬁnitions  of  the  concepts  of  standing  and  interventions.”7 However, in 2000, Mr. Justice Bastarache
of   the   Supreme   Court   of   Canada   suggested   the   intervener’s   role  
may  not  need  to  be  as  expansive  in  the  future.8  Based  on  your  legal  
experience  from  both  sides  of  the  bench,  what  are  your  thoughts  on  
the role of the intervener?
My experience has been that interveners often provide an important and
a different perspective on a case. I’m a big fan of granting broad access
to interveners in constitutional litigation—especially at the appellate
level. At the trial level, courts need to be just a bit more careful because
4

(1985-1988).
(2003), 65 O.R. (3d) 161, 225 D.L.R. (4th) 529.
6
Ontario Court of Justice, General Division (1993-1999); Ontario Court of Appeal
(1999-present).
7
Justice James MacPherson, “Civil Disobedience and the law: the role of legal
professionals” (2003) 41 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 371.
8
Luiza Chwialkowska, “Rein in lobby groups, senior judges suggest” April 2000,
National Post.
5
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when you have a trial unfolding, witnesses are often present. If you have
interveners trying to make their legal arguments right at the front-end,
it can take some of the focus away from the conduct of the trial. But
once you get to the appellate level—especially at the Supreme Court of
Canada—the cases usually raise issues of national importance. And at
that level, it is highly desirable to have as broad a range of views of the
legal issues as you can possibly get.
During the same-sex marriage case9 in the Ontario Court of Appeal,
there  were  ﬁve  or  six  interveners  on  both  sides.  Égale10 was present—one
of the best and most well-known interveners in our legal world—supporting gay and lesbian rights. We also had the Interfaith Coalition.11 It
was the umbrella for Christian, Hindu, Jewish and Muslim groups—all
who opposed same-sex marriage—and represented by a very highly respected Toronto lawyer. Then we had a third group, called the Collation
of Liberal Rabbis for Same-Sex Marriage. Today, I can still picture all
three lawyers for those three groups. I see their factums and I remember
their oral arguments. They were all helpful and good, though you can
imagine how different they were.
As a judge, you can structure the role played by interveners. For example, interveners can be directed in terms of the time they are given in
your appellate court, or instructed to only submit a factum but not do an
oral argument. These are all ways to ensure that interveners don’t take
over a case. I usually would be more inclined to accommodate interveners, than to restrict them.
The  public,  nevertheless,  has  often  displayed  concern  about  whether  interveners  could  negatively  inﬂuence  the  court.  Some  have  gone  
so  far  as  to  suggest  that  the  courts  could  be  hijacked  by  special  interests.  Do  you  think  there  are  any  dangers  present  in  allowing  for  
large  numbers  of  interveners?  For  example,  do  you  see  any  potential  of  the  intervener  being  used  to  as  a  Trojan  Horse  for  political  or  
corporate  groups  that  may  not  be  directly  affected  by  the  issue?

9

Supra note 5.
Egale Canada Inc. (Equality for Gays and Lesbians Everywhere.)
11
The Interfaith Coalition on Marriage and Family.
10
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No,  I  ﬁnd  that  most  of  the  interveners  who  come  in  are  quite  open  in  
saying, “Here’s our group and we want to say this, so please let us in to
say it.” I don’t see anyone being so nuanced or subtle as to say, “Look,
let’s not ask permission to be an intervener—let’s retain someone else
to do it for us.” The National Citizen Coalition was a regular intervener
a few years ago, and their views were certainly very similar to corporate
Canada. Yet I never had any sense that there was anything overly subtle
about how they got in front of the court. They were there because they
were a well-funded interest group with a clear view of public issues.
Concern  has  also  been  directed  at  the  issue  of  judges’  conduct  within  the  courtroom.  Some  litigants  worry  that  judges  have  made  up  
their   minds   before   entering   the   room,   and   might   be   overly   combative  towards  the  litigant.  The  concern  is  that  this  confrontational  
approach  places  judges  in  a  role  where  they  become  advocates  for  
a  position,  when  their  job  is  to  judge,  and  not  to  ﬁght.  Nevertheless,  
the  “jousting”  matches  between  judges  and  litigants  are  defended  
as   being   a   major   aspect   of   the   appellate   process.   What   are   your  
views  on  the  utility  and  proper  scope  of  these  exchanges?    
My starting point is that there is a world of difference between the role
of a judge during a trial and the appellate process. A judge should be
virtually  silent  in  a  trial.  Our  role  is  just  like  a  trafﬁc  cop—to  try  to  keep  
everything moving. Judges have to make rulings, and that means we do
have to speak. But when the trial is unfolding and the witnesses are telling their stories, there is virtually, in my view, no role for a trial judge in
any of that. If you read a trial transcript, you should not see “The Court”
mentioned in more than the opening, recess, and the rulings.
An appeal is very different. The evidence is all in, the parties aren’t
there, and there are no witnesses testifying. It is lawyers arguing about
legal errors, and in the appellate process, I think it is fundamental that
lawyers be challenged as they make their arguments. If a judge thinks
certain things about a legal argument, a lawyer will want to know what
those things are, so that he or she can respond to them.
So I think “jousting matches”—which aren’t a bad description of a
lot of appeal cases—are not only normal, but also highly desirable in the
appellate context. I think my adjectives to describe the appellate process
would be “candour” and “courtesy”. The jousting should be character-
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ized by “candour”. In this sense, the judge asks very clear questions, and
signals to the lawyer what he needs assistance with. However, the judge
must also exercise “courtesy”, and listen to the answers. As a judge, we
cannot be too argumentative, rude, or long winded. By all means, ask
questions and engage in rigorous discussions with the lawyers, but do it
with courtesy.
The  perception  of  judges  has  changed  signiﬁcantly  since  the  years  
when   you   ﬁrst   started   your   legal   career.   The   myth   of   the   judges  
as  oracles  of  justice  has  long  since  disappeared,  and,  consequently,  
the  public  has  taken  an  active  interest  in  the  legal  system  and  the  
composition   of   our   courts.   The   recent   release   of   the   ﬁnal   part   of  
the Gomery Report12  points  to  this,  recommending  the  devolvement  
of  certain  powers  from  the  Prime  Minister  to  parliamentary  committees.  This  suggests  that  there  is  a  greater  likelihood  that  future  
judicial  appointments  will  be  subject  to  more  scrutiny  by  committees.  How  do  you  feel  this  may  effect  the  composition  of  the  courts  
and  our  justice  system?
There are a lot of judges who are opposed to having a new committee
system to vet judicial appointments and interview potential judges. I
don’t share any of that. I think people who want to be judges will still
apply for the job. I would not be troubled by appearing before a parliamentary committee and answering questions. Of course, there are a lot
of questions a potential candidate would have to avoid. The main ones
are questions which deal with particular areas of law, or what that candidate’s views might be on cases likely to come before them.
I watched the swearing in of Chief Justice Roberts in the United
States before the Senate, and I thought his answers were by and large
terriﬁc.  He  steered  away  from  things  he  couldn’t  be  too  precise  on,  such  
as the question “are you going to reverse Roe v. Wade”—you can’t answer an issue that may be before you in the next year or two—but he
was still able to give a sense of himself as a professional and as a person
to the public and the Senators.

12

Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities,
Restoring Accountability: Recommendations (Canadian Government Publishing,
2006).
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Some say that parliamentary committees mean that fewer good
judges will apply to the bench because of their reluctance to go under
that type of scrutiny. I say, “Tough luck, we don’t need them.” There are
lots  of  other  highly  qualiﬁed  people  who  would  be  willing  to  submit  to  
that type of scrutiny.
Do   you   think   changes   to   the   appointment   process   will   affect   the  
principle  of  judicial  independence?  And  what  effect  could  they  have  
on  the  politicization  of  the  judiciary?
My sense is that it wouldn’t politicize the judiciary in Canada. Until I
see a parliamentary committee being overtly political in their scrutiny of
a judge, I would take the view that Canadian politicians understand the
difference between politics and judicial life. That being the case, they
would ask the type of questions that are legitimate for a potential holder
of  judicial  ofﬁce.  
Of course, there is always a risk of going overboard, like it sometimes has in the Untied States. Usually though, the process makes you
feel very good about the people who do get approved. The careful scrutiny has wiped out a couple of appointments in the United States, and
these were good people to get wiped out. So until I see things going
wrong in Canada, I would say that this value of openness can apply to
the judiciary just as much as it does to the other branches of government.
In  addition  to  issues  of  perception  of  our  judges,  there  have  been  
several  concrete  problems  emerging  from  the  daily  operation  of  the  
courts.  The  type  of  people  approaching  the  court  to  seek  remedies  
has  changed.  There  are  a  growing  number  of  self-represented  litigants  appearing  before  both  trial  and  appellate  courts.13 Some have
attributed   it   to   growing   distrust   of   lawyers,   while   others   point   to  
problems  with  the  growing  costs  of  litigation.  What  is  your  experience  with  this  problem,  and  what  are  your  thoughts  on  its  resolution?

13

Chief Justice McMurtry, “Canada a Just Society?” (2005 Symons Lecture on the
State of Canadian Confederation). The lecture pointed to access to justice by the poor
this becoming one of most serious problems in the Canadian justice system.
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I was a trial judge for six years, and I’ve been an appeal court judge for
six years. If you ask me what major changes I’ve seen in our court system in those twelve years, I would say my observation is there are more
and more cases in which people are representing themselves. This is not
by  choice,  but  because  of  ﬁnancial  difﬁculties.  
These people are in either of two categories. One category is the
poor. They have always had to represent themselves for lack of resources. But there’s a new category—the middle class who just can’t afford
the steep fees that lawyers tend to charge. So the result is that even in a
major appeal, it’s not unusual to see someone with everything at stake
in their lives representing themselves. It is a major and growing issue
that is getting worse.
So how do you solve this problem? Our governments have got to be
willing to increase funding and improve the delivery of legal aid for our
poor. The model in some jurisdictions is to fund lawyers in the private
sector to take on legal aid cases. True, the hourly rates that lawyers get
for that are low, but nevertheless it’s expensive if you are funding lawyers in the private sector on an hourly basis.
I’m actually a supporter of increasing government-run legal aid clinics. I think we should look at establishing more professional legal aid
clinics on a province-wide basis, staffed by professional legal aid lawyers. Opponents say it will be a second rate system for poor people, but
I just don’t agree with that. I think we have some of the most dedicated
and experienced lawyers in the legal aid clinics around the country, and
there is nothing second-rate about how they deliver legal services at all.
Nova Scotia actually is one of the better provinces in that regard. It has
a very extensive system of legal aid clinics all around the province. My
province of Ontario has a lot more to do in that area.
For the other category, middle-class people just aren’t going to be
able to apply for legal aid. Yet when you look at their resumes, you
see that they simply can’t afford litigation either. Quite frankly, I think
lawyers are going to have to look at their fee structures—particularly
in urban Canada. Our middle-class can’t afford lawyers because lawyers cost too much. Many lawyers struggle to make a living, but lots of
lawyers don’t struggle at all. They make a very substantial amount of
money. I think they need to recognize that the fee structure is sometimes
too high, and drives people in directions they shouldn’t have to go.
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We simply can’t just go on with our two-tiered system of legal services. The poor qualify for legal aid, while the wealthy can afford full-fee
services  from  the  big  ﬁrms.  The  range  of  people  and  their  legal  problems  
are far too nuanced for those types of black and white categories. I think
an interesting example is what some trade unions do for their workers:
they  contract  with  certain  law  ﬁrms  to  represent  whatever’s  happening  
in  the  private  lives  of  their  members.  This  is  done  on  a  ﬁxed  or  a  modest  
fee. When I hear about this, it strikes me as a good model.
Do  you  think  judges  have  an  added  duty  towards  self-represented  
litigants?
Yes, I do. That’s an interesting question, because it’s a question every
judge faces. Some judges take the view, “I’m going to do nothing different at all, because I have to be absolutely impartial in the way I treat
people.” Other judges would say, “I am going to give an explanation of
almost every facet of what will happen here, and I may even step in and
assist the self-represented person during the trial at key moments with
questions of examination or cross-examination”.
I think most judges would fall somewhere between these views.
They would probably say that we have a duty to try to carefully explain
the trial process to the person from the start. This should be done on a
very simple and clear level, so that they can understand the opening
statements,  which  side  goes  ﬁrst,  when  witnesses  are  called,  and  what  a  
cross-examination is. All of this should be directed at the person who is
going to have to walk through the process themselves. We also have to
be willing to come back to this during the trial, especially if the person
has obviously misunderstood something, or is getting it wrong.
Would  you  say  this  additional  assistance  to  self-represented  litigants  
has  any  adverse  impact  on  a  judge’s  discretionary  independence?
No. If the assistance given is a procedural explanation of the litigant’s
role, I don’t think that would create any perception of bias in favour of
that person. Lawyers for the opposing side always understand why we
do this. So far, I’ve never had a lawyer say to me, “I just think you’re
playing too much of a role in helping this person”.

PRINCIPLE AND IMAGINATION IN JUDGING . . . 281

As soon as I know I have a self-represented litigant, I always carefully map out some instructions at the start of the trial to assist them.
However, when we actually get to the trial, I don’t feel I should intervene. It is the litigant’s job to present their case, and to attack the other
side as best they can.
A  second  but  equally  pressing  problem  with  the  operations  of  our  
courts  is  an  ongoing  difﬁcultly  with  case  management.14 Cases have
consistently  grown  lengthier  and  more  complex,  which  consequently  puts  heavy  strain  on  the  scarce  resources  of  the  courts,  making  
them  far  less  accessible.  How  would  you  characterize  this  problem,  
and how should courts ameliorate it?
There is no doubt that cases are getting longer, more complex, and more
expensive. By and large that is undesirable, and steps need to be taken to
correct it. I’ve never had a role in court administration, but it has always
struck me how unfortunate it is that we have so many steps in litigation
at the trial level in Canada. This means more than one judge is often
involved, so you may have an early motion with one judge, and another
preliminary motion with a different judge three months later. Then at
trial, yet another judge will hear the same issue.
In the United States, most states assign a judge to a case as soon as
the  case  is  ﬁled.  The  same  judge  will  hear  everything  in  the  case,  and  
that judge is responsible for moving the case. I think we need to look to
that model in Canada. As a judge, if we know that this is our case, we
will take a lot more control over it, and push lawyers to move it forward
more quickly. If we watch over the same case, we will have an idea of
whether it is too long, too expensive, or too complex. This is an area
where I think the Americans are really probably better than us. In the
United  States,  the  trial  for  a  high-proﬁle  person  charged  with  murder  
will be over within a year. In Canada, the same trial may take three
years.
About  ﬁve  years  ago,  a  high-proﬁle  football  player  for  the  Baltimore  
Ravens was charged with murder on the day of the Super Bowl. The trial
took place in May, just three months later. I remember thinking: What if
14

See Justice Roy McMurtry, “Report of the Honourable R. Roy McMurtry”,
(2005) Ontario Justice Education Network. Chief Justice McMurty noted that cases
are  getting  signiﬁcantly  more  lengthy  and  complex.
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someone from the Montréal Canadians was charged with murder on the
same day, and represented by a leading defence lawyer? When would
that trial take place in Canada? The answer would probably be more
than two years after being charged. To me, that’s just wrong.
Constitutional   jurisprudence   has   seen   its   own   changes   over   the  
years.  As   an   experienced   lawyer   and   judge   of   constitutional   law,  
what  do  you  see  as  being  the  next  big  area  of  constitutional  litigation?  Are  there  any  major  areas  of  constitutional  law  that  you  see  
as  being  unsettled?
I think the Supreme Court’s decision in the Chaoulli15 case a few months
ago is fascinating. For starters, it is a four-to-three split, with a very
strong judgment written each way. It also raises the fundamental issue
of how far the court will go in asserting positive rights and forcing governments  to  actually  do  things  afﬁrmatively  in  the  delivery  of  services.  
We saw a bit of that in the Dunmore16 case. There, the Court said there is
an obligation for governments with statutory regimes to protect workers
in order to make sure they include vulnerable groups of employees in
some of that protection.
In other words, if the government is going to step onto the stage,
they have to make sure that they cover all the groups once they are on
that stage. In Chaoulli, the majority stepped into the delivery of our
healthcare system, using the Charter17 as a mechanism to do that. The
minority said that is precisely the sort of thing a court should not do.
I think that there will be some very interesting decisions dealing with
what I call positive rights over the next few years.
There is another area that I think appellate courts will have to come
to grips with. As judges, we always like to look at the jurisprudence and
ask, “Is the law contributing to the progress of society?” During my
lifetime as a lawyer, I would say that the law has contributed positively
in most areas to Canadian society, our legal system, and the administration of justice.
15

Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 SCR 791, 2005 SCC 35.
Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 1016, 207 D.L.R. (4th)
193.
17
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
16
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However, we always need to ask, “Where is progress not happening?”  I  think  criminal  trials  are  signiﬁcantly  worse  today  than  they  were  
when I was a young lawyer starting out thirty years ago. I think much of
the criminal Charter jurisprudence has made our process too complicated. Appellate courts have attempted to make the criminal process overly
sophisticated and subtle by imposing too many restrictions on the way
prosecutors and judges conduct themselves at trial. Our criminal trials
are now too long, complicated, and expensive. The result is that they are
not as fair or just as they were thirty years ago. I think appellate courts
in particular have to ask themselves if they aren’t the main authors of
that regression, and try to deal with it.
At  the  heart  of  all  these  changes,  a  judge  remains  a  constant  focal  
point.  Indeed,  this  places  a  signiﬁcant  amount  of  pressure  on  them  
to  be  just  and  principled.  However,  what  seems  fair  may  not  necessarily  be  what  is  principled.  I  wonder,  when  principle  wins  out  over  
fairness,  do  you  feel  regretful  of  any  of  the  decisions?
I have felt uncomfortable with some of the sentences that I felt I had
to impose, though this occurred more during my time as a trial judge
than an appeal judge. Today, we can have conditional sentences for all
criminal offences. Appeal courts do try to set ranges for the sentencing
of different offences. But the last thing you want is eclectic sentencing
at the trial level. For example on Monday, someone charged with an offence might get a sentence of two years less a day to be served in their
home; while on Tuesday, another person charged with exactly the same
offence gets a sentence of three years in the federal penitentiary.
However, I have occasionally felt that the ranges were wrong when I
looked at a particular case. Once, I had to sentence a Spanish American
drug courier. He was a Spanish man from South America living in New
York and trying to raise his young family. He had been offered $1,000.00
to drive an old Cadillac across the border into Canada. The Cadillac had
been shelled out so that a lot of cocaine could be put into the trunk,
and this man who had never been to Canada in his life got caught at
the border. When he came on for trial, the jury found him guilty and I
had to impose a sentence at the end. This was an offence of importing,
which was the worst offence. It was also for cocaine, which is a real bad
drug. I knew I would have to sentence him to quite a lot, though on the
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other hand, I knew that he was a courier who had crossed the border for
$1,000.00. I knew that he had a wife and two young children back in
New York, and that he was from South America. So how long should he
serve in a Canadian jail? Well, I had to follow the range for the offence,
regardless. The sentence that I imposed was nine years. I remember
thinking, “that’s so high”, and I wish I didn’t have to do that.
At the other end of the spectrum was a case where a trial judge had
sentenced a son to house arrest for killing his mother. The jury had convicted him of second degree murder, and I thought: You shouldn’t be
sentenced to house arrest for killing your mother. I felt that the sentence
was not long enough in that case, but the law at the time allowed it.
It  seems  certain  that  the  future  legal  landscape  will  present  many  
novel  challenges  for  judges  where  pure  principle  will  still  be  compromised.   How   do   judges   balance   a   principled   approach   with   all  
the  other  competing  interests  and,  in  particular,  your  own  personal  
view  of  what  is  right  for  a  case?
It  is  difﬁcult,  particularly  at  the  appellate  level.  We  want  to  try  to  do  the  
right thing, but we also know that what we write at the appellate level
will be what trial judges will have to follow. We do try to think through
what we’re saying in each case, what the effect of that might be with
future cases down the road, and try to factor that in as we’re making our
decision. Essentially, we’re gazing into a crystal ball.
Chief Justice Dickson once said the role of a judge is to combine
principle and imagination. It’s tough to do. Principle is so much easier
for lawyers and judges because that’s what we’re taught from year one
in law school—applying principles and knowledge. Finding the right
case in which to use our imagination and advance the law is hard, but I
think it’s important to occasionally try.
Most judges like to think that they are trying to make decisions that
are principled and anchored in the jurisprudence. They try to balance
their application of the principles to the facts of the case. You get a bit
uncomfortable if you start to move outside of that. So we never like to
say that there is also a personal element present—either in terms of a
lifetime of experience and values, or our view of those litigants. We
are  never  comfortable  in  thinking  that  these  inﬂuence  our  decisions  a  
lot. Yet the reality is that if a judge lives a professional life before they
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become a judge, their view of the litigants and their own experiences
and values are important in the decisions they make. It’s not surprising
that those will continue to be important when they are a judge; but how
they  quantify  and  articulate  that  is  difﬁcult,  because  they’re  not  used  to  
thinking that way when they are a judge.
Oliver Wendell Holmes once described this as the “inarticulate major premise”. Most judges would say “boy, if I had a major premise I’m
going to articulate it” and they do. For the most part, what they think
they are doing is articulating in terms of the legal principles and their
application to the evidence—the mix of law and facts. But there is a
level below “major premise”, which may be inarticulable for judges
in the sense that they feel it, and it is important to their decision. They
may not articulate it, but it is an intuitive feeling for the people that are
involved in the case.
This was in my head during the Halpern case when we were considering whether to suspend the declaration. I looked at all the section 15
jurisprudence that came before Halpern. I also looked at the reality of
the people standing before me. The question I asked myself was, “Are
gay people capable of long, lasting, intimate relationships?” My answer
was, “Of course.” When then, should we recognise their right—now, or
two years from now? I had to ask, “Why not now?”

